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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a cluster of issues which could be addressed under the broad theme 
indicated by the title of this article. These include: the question of how has the 
irrationality of administrative action and decision-making become variously 
defined and interpreted by the British judiciary within the last two decades? If it 
is possible to identify a coherent legal definition of irrationality, have the judges 
acted in a reasonably consistent manner when applying this ‘definition’; that is, 
is it necessary to compare the standards supposedly applicable with the actual 
practice of judicial decision-making in this area, identifying areas of discrepancy 
within the case-law? If we can identify such areas of clear discrepancies between 
principle and judicial practice, what questions arise from such discrepancies 
relating to the legitimacy and constitutionality of this judicial review of merits, 
or the meaning, scope and implications of judicial decision-making in relation to 
the role of the executive?  
 
   Insofar as issues of legitimacy and constitutionality can be raised, should we be 
suspicious of academic analysis which deploys such ostensibly objective 
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conceptions as a possible ‘cover’ for the expression of subjective dislike of an 
interventionist welfare state, and related, if concealed, ideological commitments 
to classic liberal interests?1 Furthermore, is it now time to abandon the traditional 
doctrinal fixation upon the abstract semantics of formal legal definition in favour 
of a broader concern with the policy grounds for mapping particular ‘standards’ 
of appropriate judicial intervention?  
 
   In addition, which, if any, contextual factors must be taken into account when 
interpreting the new standards? Having identified such contextual factors are we 
able to classify these according to a single context of application, or is it 
necessary to refocus on multiple, not necessarily, compatible contexts? 
Moreover, if substitution of judgment (in other words, the universally accepted 
limit on judicial intervention2) is able to provide a legitimate benchmark for the 
constitutional boundaries of the courts of review, then is it possible to support 
such claims by reference to clear case law establishing that this is the case? In 
both cases, is it possible to provide clear and compelling answers to these 
questions? If not, then does it follow that academic analysis should abandon 
traditional concerns for the unity of public law doctrine in favour of focusing 
upon the potentially overlapping contexts of application? Finally, is one of the 
implications of recent legal developments, including attempts to come to terms 
with the demands of the Human Rights Act 1998, the notion that academic 
analysis can no longer start from the premise of judicial independence. Instead, 
should we seriously consider recent academic claims for a ‘democratic 
dialogue’,3 ‘due deference’4 or ‘cultures of justification’5 for which the political 
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and executive role of the judges is arguably more transparent and 
institutionalised? 
 
   It is not, of course, possible for a single study to address all of these 
interrelated questions and issues in adequate depth. For pragmatic reasons, this 
article focuses upon defining ‘irrationality’ and analyses the standard of 
intervention this definition imposes. It then considers examples of the judicial 
deployment of the so-called ‘standard of irrationality’, questioning whether, in 
practice, there is a discrepancy in its application by the courts. The general 
conclusion to the present article calls for an evaluation of the legitimacy of such 
identified discrepancies. Such an evaluation must give particular attention to the 
manner of the review and the context of the administrative decision under 
examination since these may be factors that affect the adoption of different 
standards of intervention by the courts. Assessing the constitutionality of these 
discrepancies will be the purpose of a subsequent article in this wider research 
project. 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Judicial review has been variously described as the courts regulating governmental 
power, the courts protecting individual rights, the courts ensuring efficient 
administration and the courts enforcing governmental accountability.6 
Nevertheless, whatever the purpose of judicial review is deemed to be, some 
propositions have become clear: orthodox principles of administrative law prescribe 
that courts engaged in review should not reconsider the merits of executive action 
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because they are not the recipients of the discretionary power.7 Judicial review is 
not an appellate procedure in which a judge reverses the substantive decision of an 
administrative body because of the sole ground that the merits are in the applicant’s 
favour. Rather, it is a supervisory procedure whereby a judge rules only upon the 
lawfulness of an executive decision, or the manner in which one was reached. The 
question for review, therefore, is whether the decision was ‘lawful or unlawful’; the 
question for appeal by contrast is whether the decision was ‘right or wrong’.8  
    
   Craig has sought to justify this distinction between review and appeal by 
reference to the source of judicial powers: powers of review derive from the courts’ 
inherent jurisdiction, whereas appeals do not – they are statutory.9 Others, however, 
have justified this distinction in less neutral terms. For instance, Lord Irvine, the 
previous Lord Chancellor, has argued that the courts should not review merits. His 
argument is that to do so violates the constitutional imperative of judicial self-
restraint. Lord Irvine identifies at least three bases for this imperative. First, ‘a 
constitutional imperative’: public authorities should exercise discretionary powers 
that have been entrusted to them by Parliament.10 Every authority has within its 
influence a level of knowledge and experience which justifies the decision of 
Parliament to entrust that authority with decision-making power. Second, ‘lack of 
judicial expertise’: it follows that the courts are ill-equipped to take decisions in 
place of the designated authority. Third, ‘the democratic imperative’: it has long 
been recognised that elected public authorities, and particularly local authorities, 
derive their authority in part from their electoral mandate.11 On this argument, these 
imperatives clearly show that the courts should not engage in a review of the merits 
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of administrative action and ought to be reluctant to exercise their powers of review 
for reasons of democracy and good government.12  
 
   This, at least, is the theory. However, Galligan submits that in practice there is no 
clear line between the merits of discretion and questions of lawfulness.13 Without 
explicit statutory guidance about the proper exercise of discretionary powers, the 
boundary between review and appeal is likely to become blurred. This, therefore, 
raises the question whether the courts are, to some extent, engaging covertly in a 
review of the substantial merits of executive decision-making when exercising 
their review powers. This question is addressed by reference to one ground of 
judicial review in particular, irrationality, since, by determining the legality of 
discretionary powers, it affords the greatest opportunity to review merits, the 
author believes.   
 
Irrationality as a Ground of Judicial Review 
 
The courts conduct the judicial review of administrative action on several grounds. 
In Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service14 
(GCHQ), Lord Diplock classified these as ‘Illegality’, ‘Irrationality’ and 
‘Procedural Impropriety’.15  
 
   ‘Illegality’ prevents power from being exceeded: administrative bodies must act 
within the powers granted to them by Parliament.16 This head of judicial review 
includes examples where a decision-maker has acted for an improper purpose,17 or 
failed to take account of relevant considerations, or ignored relevant ones.18 
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‘Irrationality’ prevents power from being abused: it allows the court to interfere 
with an administrative decision that is not within a range of options open to a 
reasonable decision-maker.19 ‘Procedural Impropriety’ prevents a breach of natural 
justice: it imposes fair decision-making procedures including the recognition of a 
legitimate expectation, 20 the right to a hearing21 and a trial by an impartial judge;22 
this head of review can also include the failure of an administrative body to 
observe a procedural rule specified by statute.23 
 
   In GCHQ Lord Diplock described an irrational decision as a decision which was: 
“so outrageous in its defiance of logic and accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have 
arrived at it”.24 The courts use forceful language to define unreasonableness25 as a 
way of showing that the standard of review is far higher than the standard applied 
in an appeal. Definitions of irrationality including the one given by Lord Diplock, 
and others such as “a pattern of perversity or absurdity of such proportions that the 
guidance could not have been framed by a bona fide exercise of political judgment 
on the part of the Secretary of State”,26 emphasise the principle that a reviewing 
court’s ruling should not reflect what it would have done if it had been granted the 
power to take a decision. For example, Lord Lowry in the House of Lords in 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind27 said: 
 
The court’s duty is not to interfere with a discretion which Parliament has 
entrusted to a statutory body or an individual but to maintain a check on 
excesses in the exercise of discretion. That is why it is not been enough if 
a judge feels able to say, like a juror or like a dissenting member of the 
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Cabinet, ‘I think that is unreasonable; that is not what I would have done.’ 
It also explains the emphatic language that the judiciary use in order to 
drive home the message and the necessity for the act to be so 
unreasonable that no reasonable minister would have done it.28 
 
   This dictum clearly illustrates the principle that a reviewing court ought not to 
intervene if it thinks that an administrative decision was wrong; interference is only 
justified if a decision was outrageous in its defiance of logic and accepted moral 
standards.  
 
   Closely examining the strong language in Lord Diplock’s definition, one would 
expect, therefore, an irrational decision to be a gross breach of discretion, possibly, 
on a par with the extreme facts of Backhouse v Lambeth London Borough 
Council.29 Here, in its desire to avoid raising rents generally as required by the then 
section 62(1) of the Housing Finance Act 1972, the council increased the rent of 
one of its unoccupied houses from £8 to £18 000 a year. Though it had technically 
complied with its legal responsibility to increase its rents by the required rates, the 
council’s action was found to be unlawful. The court ruled that it was unreasonable 
to levy the raise upon one house. If the decision examined by the court in Lambeth 
London Borough Council is a case in point, unreasonable acts of the executive are, 
therefore, likely to be infrequent in practice. Cane agrees. He states: “Applied 
literally, [this head of review] is so stringent that unreasonable decisions are likely 
to be a very rare occurrence in real life”.30  
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MERITS 
 
Notwithstanding the seemingly unambiguous language describing the proper 
application of irrationality, judges, when employing this test, have engaged in a 
review of the merits, and it is the purpose of this article to identify examples of such 
judicial encroachments. Before doing so, however, the author wishes to clarify the 
meaning he attributes to merits review. There is obviously a critical difference 
between a judge thinking about the merits and a judge making a decision on the 
basis of merits. In order to apply even the irrationality test, a judge must inevitably 
consider the merits underlying an impugned decision. As Craig says: “All tests of 
substantive judicial review entail the judiciary in taking some view of the merits of 
the contested action”.31 The author therefore uses the phrase ‘merits-review’ to 
refer to a situation where a judge has more than thought about the merits: s/he has 
gone onto reaching a decision on the basis of merits. For the purposes of this 
article, this can be evidenced, the author believes, from examples where a judge has 
clearly employed a standard of unreasonableness that is lower than the standard 
implied by Lord Diplock’s definition of irrationality in GCHQ. Why? Taking 
literally the language of Lord Diplock’s test, a judge applying a lower standard 
would be required to undertake a balancing exercise of the pros and cons of the 
administrative decision originally taken, since the extreme nature of the decision 
would not speak for itself. Backhouse referred to above, which the author associates 
with Lord Diplock’s standard, is an example where a court’s ruling upon the merits 
of the case was not required, since the ‘result’ of the administrative decision – 
levying the rate rise on one property – was clearly in the extreme, and therefore 
irrational. 
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   Jowell and Lester have argued that judges have reviewed decisions that are not 
unreasonable: “The courts are willing to impugn decisions that are far from absurd 
and are often coldly rational”.32 Following this, certain cases will be identified 
where a judge has ruled that the substance33 of an administrative decision was 
irrational, but it will be submitted that s/he conducted review upon the merits, 
because facts surrounding the case do not support the court’s ruling that the 
decision-maker was acting outrageously in the defiance of logic.  
 
   The first case to be analysed where it is believed that a low standard of 
unreasonableness was employed is Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council34 
in the House of Lords. Here, Leicester Rugby Club challenged the council’s 
decision preventing it from using a recreation ground for a year. The applicants 
argued that the council had withdrawn the use of the ground because it had not 
prevented four of its players from accompanying a rebel rugby tour to South 
Africa.35 In ruling that the council’s action had been unreasonable, Lord Roskill 
stated (with whom Lords Bridge, Brightman, Templeman and Griffiths concurred): 
“In a field where other views can equally legitimately be held, persuasion, however 
powerful, must not be allowed to cross the line where it moved into the field of 
illegitimate pressure coupled with the threat of sanctions”.36 
 
   Since the House of Lords in Wheeler published their speeches only about eight 
months after GCHQ, they ought to have been alive to the standard intended by 
Lord Diplock, especially as Lord Roskill specifically referred to it.37 However, it is 
arguable that the court adopted a lower standard. If it had not done so, it would 
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have conceivably ruled that the council’s decision was not irrational as the council 
had been complying with its statutory duty under the Race Relations Act 197638 to 
promote race relations. To further emphasise that the decision was not irrational 
because of the fact that there were divergent views on this matter, Peiris notes: 
 
In the light of the statutory duty imposed on the local authority to do all in 
its power to promote racial harmony, the council may well be forgiven the 
cynical reflection that abstention from the course which they followed 
could have entailed equal, if not greater, vulnerability in terms of 
the…Wednesbury formula.39 
 
   By withdrawing the use of the recreation ground from the rugby club, the council 
was making a public statement. It was severing links with the club and four of its 
players as a way of disassociating the City of Leicester (the council and its 
residents) from a tour that had endorsed the Government of South Africa’s policy 
of apartheid. Given the importance of the club as a sporting ambassador for the city, 
could it be said that the council was acting unreasonably?40  
 
   The decision of the Court of Appeal in West Glamorgan County Council v 
Rafferty and Others41 is another example where a judge, by finding an 
administrative decision to be irrational, was arguably employing a lower standard 
of unreasonableness than Lord Diplock in GCHQ. Here the court held that West 
Glamorgan County Council had acted unreasonably in seeking an order for 
possession of land occupied by ‘gypsies’ without providing the occupiers with 
alternative accommodation.42 Was the decision of the council really irrational? 
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First, the ‘gypsies’ were not being evicted from land that had been granted to them 
by the council – they were trespassers causing a nuisance. Second, although the 
Caravan Sites Act 1968, section 6, imposed a duty upon the council to provide land 
for the accommodation of travelling people, it did not oblige local councils to act in 
every case. Rather, the statute was only to apply ‘so far as may be necessary’.43  
 
   In view of the two arguments above one is entitled to argue that the Court of 
Appeal reviewed the merits of the council’s decision. Indeed, this conclusion can 
be supported by reference to Bailey et al: “Given that there were ‘admissible 
factors on both sides of the question’ in Rafferty, can it be said that the council 
‘must have taken leave of its senses’ in coming to its decision?”44 
 
   In the Divisional Court in Regina v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex 
parte Lonrho PLC45 Lonrho challenged two decisions of the Secretary of State. 
First, the Minister had withheld publication of the Director General of Fair 
Trading’s report into the takeover of House of Fraser by the Al Fayed brothers. 
Second, the Minister had not referred the takeover to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC). The court held that the Secretary of State had acted 
irrationally on both counts. 
 
   As regards Secretary of State’s second decision, it is arguable he gave a sensible 
explanation for not referring the takeover to the MMC. He was unwilling to make a 
referral as this would have involved divulging the contents of the Director 
General’s report. He did not wish to disclose the report’s contents (which was his 
first decision) because of the risk that a fraud investigation would have been 
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compromised. Knowing the Secretary of State’s reasons for non-disclosure of the 
Report’s contents, was it, therefore, irrational not to refer the takeover to the MMC? 
Borrie disagrees. He says: “The court’s grant of mandatory relief amounted to a 
blatant usurpation of the Secretary of State’s discretion”.46 
 
   In the Divisional Court in Regina v Cornwall County Council, Ex parte Cornwall 
and Isles of Scilly Guardians Ad Litem and Reporting Panel47 Sir Stephen Brown P 
ruled that the respondent had acted unreasonably in quashing the decision of the 
Director of Social Services for Cornwall County Council.48 The Director had 
declared that the Guardians Ad Litem (GALRO) should spend no more than sixty-
five hours on each child's case and that no fees would be paid for time spent over 
that limit unless prior authorisation had been obtained. 
 
   For several reasons the Director of Social Services, it is contended, did not act 
irrationally. First, he had taken his decision in a climate where there was a need for 
reductions in public expenditure – advice from the Government had stated that 
panel committees and managers should ensure that expenses, fees and allowances 
claimed by guardians were proper and reasonable. Second, the costs of the GALRO 
scheme had increased by 100% in four years. Third, although the Director had 
reduced the average number of hours spent on each child’s case from ninety-two to 
sixty-five, this lower figure (which he was prepared to exceed in exceptional 
circumstances) was still much higher than the average number of hours – forty-four 
– spent on a case in the neighbouring county of Dorset. In view of these 
circumstances it is arguable that the Divisional Court reviewed the merits of the 
Director’s decision. Indeed, the author is not alone in reaching this conclusion. 
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Cane implies that the Divisional Court did so too. He argues, when referring to this 
case: “Even when a court purports to quash a decision because it is Wednesbury 
unreasonable, it may be applying a standard of unreasonableness less stringent than 
that specified by Lord [Diplock]”.49 
 
   In the Divisional Court in Regina v Cambridge District Health Authority, Ex 
parte B50 Laws J held that the decision of the Cambridge District Health Authority 
not to fund further medical treatment for a girl, B, aged ten with cancer had been 
unreasonable.51 In so doing, the judge cautioned the courts against second-guessing 
administrative decisions originally intended by the Legislature to be taken by the 
primary decision-maker (which in this case was the health authority). The judge 
stated: 
 
It is, of course, no part of my evidence to make medical judgments: not 
only because I have not the competence, but because the judicial review 
court does not…re-decide the merits of administrative decisions, since to 
do so would be to usurp the role of the decision-maker which has been 
confided to him by or under an Act of Parliament.52 
 
   Despite this warning by Laws J it is ironic that the standard he adopted may have 
caused him to conduct a review upon the merits. First, it is arguable that the health 
authority was not acting irrationally in a public law sense in refusing to offer the 
applicant the cancer treatment she required: it had a success rate of only between 10 
and 20%; it was at variance with the majority of medical opinion; and it was 
experimental rather than standard therapy. Second, the opinions of the doctors who 
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had treated the child for much of her life are also of relevance. They thought that it 
would not be right to subject her to further suffering and trauma when the prospects 
for success were so slight, and carried a high risk of early morbidity. Third, B had 
already undergone a course of total body irradiation. According to accepted 
medical opinion, this was therapy which no one could undergo more than once. 
Finally, substantial expenditure on treatment with such a small prospect of success 
would arguably not have been an effective use of financial resources. With a 
limited budget, the authority, it is fair to say, had a responsibility to ensure that 
sufficient funds were available for the care of other patients. 
 
   Taking account of these many factors, it is submitted that the authority’s decision 
to withhold further therapy from the child could not be categorised as irrational.53 
Indeed, Mullender can support this submission. He says:  
 
[Laws J] departs from the long-understood purpose of judicial review 
which is merely to pass on a decision's lawfulness. He instead adjudicates 
on its merits, for example, from his refusal to accept the Health 
Authority’s view that the remedial treatment at stake in the case could be 
characterised as experimental.54 
 
   As a final example of merits review when employing irrationality there is the 
ruling of the Divisional Court in Regina v Coventry City Council, Ex parte Phoenix 
Aviation.55 Here the court held that the council had acted unlawfully in restricting 
the flights of live animals from Coventry Airport, after breaches of airport security 
by public demonstrators opposed to the exports. Simon Brown LJ said: “The 
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council’s resolution was wholly disproportionate to the security risk presented at 
the time”.56 
 
   Here, Warwickshire Police were worried about the penetration of the airport’s 
perimeter fence by the demonstrators so wrote to the airport manager. Mr Brewer, 
the Assistant Chief Constable, expressed his concerns should the flights resume and 
urged him to undertake a comprehensive review of security (the police did not have 
a responsibility to protect the airport from trespass). In following the police’s 
advice, the council explored the option of improving the strength of the airport’s 
perimeter fence. This was rejected, however, because the likely time to complete 
the work – 2-3 months – was too long. (In any case, the estimated cost for the work 
was prohibitive: £400,000.) To deter further security breaches by the demonstrators 
the next course of action was to cease the live animal exports, which the council 
did. Was this not, therefore, an option addressing the unease of the police that was 
practical in the short term? If so, is it right to categorise the council’s decision as 
unreasonable in a public law sense?  
 
A LEGITIMATE REVIEW OF MERITS? 
 
The previous section identified examples of the courts applying a low standard of 
irrationality, and therefore reviewing the merits of the particular administrative 
decision in question; this, the author established at the beginning of this article, is 
constitutionally improper. But are these low standards of irrationality in fact 
illegitimate? Perhaps the true manner in which the courts reviewed the merits of 
some of these decisions was not unconstitutional? For example, Jowell and 
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Lester have argued that the ruling by the House of Lords in Wheeler, which the 
present author has argued was not irrational, was an example where the courts 
possibly employed the proportionality test: 
 
 Lord Templeman considered [the council’s decision] to be a misuse of 
power, ‘punishing the club where it had done no wrong’. Lord Roskill 
considered the withdrawal of a licence to be an unfair means of pursuing 
the council’s ends. Both speeches reflect the notion of proportionality, Lord 
Templeman concentrating on the lack of relation between the penalty and 
the wrong, Lord Roskill concentrating on the lack of relation between the 
penalty and the council’s legitimate objectives.57  
 
 The proportionality test, depending on whether a ‘qualified right’ is under 
consideration, is used, for example, in the jurisprudence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Qualified 
rights are generally recognised as those which can be infringed by the state only 
where the infringement is prescribed by law, pursued for a legitimate aim, such 
as national security or the prevention of disorder or crime, and necessary in a 
democratic society.58 That is, they require a reviewing court to ask itself whether 
there was a pressing social need for infringing the right, and if so, whether this 
was proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. This involves the court, 
therefore, in balancing the private interest of the applicant with the public 
interest of the administrative body. This is, without doubt, a more intensive 
method of review than what is required by a court when adopting the irrationality 
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test, where a review court is asking itself only whether a decision had fallen 
within the range of responses lawfully open to the executive body.59 
 
 Wheeler is, perhaps, not the only case analysed above where the court adopted 
the proportionality test. It will be recalled that Simon Brown LJ in Regina v 
Coventry City Council, Ex parte Phoenix Aviation60 stated: “The council’s 
resolution was wholly disproportionate to the security risk presented at the 
time”.61 These words arguably imply that the judge may have reviewed the 
merits of the council’s decision. This was because he was employing the 
proportionality test rather than the Wednesbury test.62 A question therefore to be 
posed from these two cases, Wheeler and Ex parte Phoenix Aviation, is whether 
the judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality, where it is arguably 
proportionality in all but name, is in fact a legitimate review of merits? 
 
 Similarly, what about another manner of judicial review disguised as irrationality, 
such as ‘hard look’? Is a judicial review of merits where this test has been adopted 
legitimate, too? It was submitted above that the Divisional Court in Regina v 
Cambridge District Health Authority, Ex parte B63 may have adopted a low 
standard of unreasonableness in finding that the decision not to fund further 
medical treatment of a child with cancer was irrational. This is possible if Laws J 
was employing a different approach to irrationality – one based upon the ‘hard 
look’ review of administrative activity in the United States.64 
 
 Craig states that the objective with ‘hard look’ is to ensure that policy alternatives 
are adequately considered, that reasons are proffered for agency decisions, and that 
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differing interests can present their views to the agency and have those views 
adequately discussed.65 This test is clearly not the same as applying irrationality. 
Irrationality is concerned with the outcome of an administrative decision and 
whether it was outrageous in its defiance of logic, a not too difficult question for a 
court, it would seem. ‘Hard look’ involves a court in a more intensive method of 
review: the legality of the administrative decision is determined by a process of 
identifying relevant factors in the exercise of the discretion and deciding the weight 
to be attached to them. 
 
 The manner in which the court reviewed the merits of a decision is not the only 
means of assessing the legitimacy of the judicial intervention identified in the cases 
above: one could evaluate them from the perspective of the context of the 
administrative decision under examination, such as the protection of the applicant’s 
fundamental rights. For example, this issue clearly affected the standard of 
irrationality employed by Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation.66 Here 
the judge sought to uphold the rule of law and prevent lawful trade from being 
disrupted because of public protest: 
 
Tempting though it may sometimes be for public authorities to yield too 
readily to threats of disruption, they must expect the courts to review any 
such decision with particular rigour – this is not an area where they can be 
permitted a wide measure of discretion. As when fundamental human 
rights are in play, the courts will adopt a more interventionist role.67 
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 Similarly, Laws J arguably justified the adoption of a low standard of irrationality 
in Ex parte B68 to account for the infringement of the applicant’s right to life. He 
stated: “The law requires that where a public body enjoys a discretion whose 
exercise may infringe [a basic liberty], it is not to be permitted to perpetrate any 
such infringement unless it can show a substantial objective justification on public 
interest grounds”.69 Laws J was evidently not assessing the respondent’s decision to 
make a judgment as to whether it had fallen within the range of responses lawfully 
open to the health authority, which is what he ought to have been doing if he was 
adopting the irrationality test. Can it be said, therefore, that Laws J was in fact 
acting in a constitutionally improper way by deploying a low standard of 
irrationality where the motive for doing so was the recognition of the applicant’s 
fundamental right to life?  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has analysed the judicial application of the irrationality test of review 
in practice. It finds that the courts have deployed an irregular standard of 
irrationality where a traditional interpretation of the case facts does not arguably 
support judicial intervention.70 Some traditionalists within public law such as 
Lord Irvine may consider this development to be a usurpation by the judiciary of 
the power of the executive and a threat to the constitutional doctrine of the 
separation of powers.71 However, the author has posed the interesting question 
whether the adoption of low standards of irrationality by the courts here were in 
fact legitimate. To this end the author proposes to undertake further research to 
reassess the classic limits of judicial intervention, reflecting the possible 
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constitutional repositioning of the courts which he has identified. He shall 
question whether the judicial reviews of merits here under the auspices of 
adopting the irrationality test were within constitutional norms, not least since the 
coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in October 2000, 
obliging a court, inter alia, to interpret legislation in line with ‘Convention 
rights’72 “so far as it is possible to do so”.73 It must be noted that the author has 
not ignored an examination of this important legislation in this article without 
good reason: because of the impossibility of addressing it with any degree of 
confidence in only one medium sized piece of work, he has reserved an analysis 
of the effect this statute has had on the constitutionality of merits-review for later 
study. For practical reasons, therefore, he has been able to work through only a 
limited range of questions, albeit in a manner that does prepare the ground for 
later analysis.  
 
   In a subsequent article the author considers whether the courts here may have 
been justified in reviewing merits because of the manner in which they applied a 
low standard of irrationality. In the period since the last case above, Ex parte 
Aviation, was examined the student of public law cannot fail to have observed 
that soon after the coming into force of the HRA the House of Lords in Regina 
(Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department74 held that proportionality 
was the correct test to be adopted where there was a suspected breach of a 
‘qualified right’ of the ECHR.75 Following this, the Court of Appeal in Regina 
(British Civilian Internees Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence76 
showed little enthusiasm for the continued use of the irrationality test.77 The 
reader may, therefore, legitimately question whether the constitutionality of 
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proportionality, not least as a separate principle of review, but also as a substitute 
for irrationality, still requires determination. However, whilst drawing some 
initial conclusions about the judicial review of merits being within constitutional 
norms where proportionality has been used as a cover for irrationality, 
importantly, the author identifies some commentators confusing the adoption of 
proportionality in practice with degrees of judicial intervention such as 
substitution of judgment where the courts are indeed overstepping their 
constitutional boundaries. This then possibly raises the more pressing question 
than that identified above: the viability of classifying any review of merits 
according to acceptable judicial limits by reference to the test of review 
employed by a court. 
 
   The second consideration of legitimacy will centre upon the argument that the 
courts in this article may also have been justified in reviewing merits because of 
the infringement of the applicants’ fundamental rights. Again, there is a 
legitimate question whether this, too, is an issue that still requires determination 
since the courts’ acceptance of a low standard of irrationality in such cases 
following, for example, the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Regina v Ministry of 
Defence, Ex parte Smith78 (and the criticisms of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Smith’s subsequent appeal that the standard of intervention was set too 
high by the Court of Appeal to act as an effective protection of the appellants’ 
privacy rights,79 which arguably was one of the very reasons for the Legislature 
precipitating the enactment of the HRA in October 2000). Again, the author 
challenges this aspersion. After analysing Smith and other related cases he does 
draw initial conclusions about the constitutionality of merits-review where 
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fundamental rights have been infringed but then questions whether there are 
identifiable boundaries to legitimate judicial intervention based on the subject 
matter of the claim under review. This, too, perhaps raises a more pressing 
question than that identified above: the viability of classifying any review of 
merits according to acceptable constitutional limits by reference to the context of 
the administrative decision in question. In the long term, therefore, this study 
will conclude that an inability to identify legitimate boundaries of judicial 
intervention with any degree of certainty for the two reasons supposed in this 
conclusion is arguably a greater threat to the principle of the separation of 
powers than identifying isolated cases where individual judges have been 
mistaken in their appreciation of the degree of discretionary power conferred 
upon an administrative body by Parliament, when finding a decision to be 
irrational. 
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beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. But in 
judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the 
human rights context is important. The more substantial the interference with 
human rights, the more the court will require by way of justification before it is 
satisfied that the decision is reasonable”. 
79 In Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 the ECtHR said 
(at 543): “The threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could 
find the Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it 
effectively excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of 
whether the interference with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social 
need or was proportionate to the national security and public order aims pursued, 
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principles which lie at the heart of the court’s analysis of complaints under article 
8 of the Convention”. 
